Human Factors Considerations in Autonomous Lethal Unmanned Aerial Systems
Kristine M. Kiernan
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
ABSTRACT
The United States military is committed to the development of complete autonomy in unmanned
vehicles, including armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS). The design and deployment of
autonomous lethal UAS raises ethical issues that have implications for human factors. System
design, procedures, and training will be impacted by the advent of autonomous lethal UAS. This
paper will define relevant vocabulary, review the literature on robot ethics as it applies to the
military setting, discuss various perspectives in the research community, address levels of UAS
autonomy, and discuss implications for operator training, responsibility, and human-machine
interaction. Familiarity with these ethical issues and their repercussions will prepare human
factors practitioners for the challenges created by this developing technology.
INTRODUCTION
The use of unmanned aerial systems (UAS) has
increased dramatically in the past ten years (McMahan
& Strawser, 2013), and is forecast to grow (Clapper,
Young, Cartwright, & Grimes, 2007). The military
forces of the United States are committed to the
development of complete autonomy in unmanned
vehicles, including armed UAS (Sharkey, 2008).
However, the development and deployment of
autonomous lethal UAS raises questions about ethics
that must be addressed. How will these autonomous
systems make moral choices? What are the potential
moral costs and benefits of autonomous lethal systems?
If these systems are truly autonomous, who bears
responsibility for their actions? In addition, the
operation of autonomous lethal UAS will lead to
changes in the human-machine interface that have far
reaching consequences for human factors.
The primary purpose of this paper is to introduce
human factors practitioners to the issues, arguments, and
possibilities surrounding autonomous lethal UAS. The
secondary purpose is to suggest some of the changes in
human-machine interaction that will develop as a result
of the implementation of autonomous lethal UAS.
REVIEW
Definitions
A discussion of the ethical considerations of
autonomous lethal UAS must begin by establishing a
common vocabulary. Familiar terms, such as morality,
ethics, autonomy, and responsibility need to be defined,
as well as less familiar concepts such as the Laws of War
and Just War theory.

The terms “morality” and “ethics” are often used
interchangeably, but a distinction is necessary in the
context of autonomous machines. Morality consists of
behaviors and beliefs about what is right and wrong
(Gros, Tessier, & Pichevin, 2012). Ethics, on the other
hand, can be defined as philosophical reflection on
morality (Ethics, 2013). Morality, therefore, is
concerned with right behavior, while ethics is concerned
with systems of thought about right behavior.
Morality and ethics are only relevant when an agent
possesses sufficient autonomy to make choices. While
there is no universally accepted definition in the
literature, a useful view of autonomy in the context of
robots is “the capacity to operate in the real-world
environment without any form of external control for
extended periods of time” (Lin, Bekey, & Abney, 2008,
p. 103). Inherent in this definition is the ability to make
decisions independently from outside control. However,
autonomy is not a binary concept. Rather, there are
levels of autonomy for both humans and machines. At
the highest level, human autonomy includes the Kantian
notion of autonomy of will. That is, human beings have
the capacity to think ethically, to reflect upon morality
and formulate a system by which to make choices. This
autonomy of will is not particularly desirable in
automated systems, since the main purpose of using
robots is to have them meet the goals set by the human
operator (Gros et al., 2012, p. 2). Therefore, when we
speak of autonomy in robots, we are talking about
autonomy of means in how to accomplish a goal, not of
end in choosing a goal. Creating a robot capable of
moral behavior is operationally desirable; creating a
robot with human-like autonomy of will that is capable
of thinking ethically is not.
Although they share the same etymology, autonomy
and automation must also be distinguished. Automation
is a “system that accomplishes a function that was

previously carried out by a human operator”
(Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000).
Automation, of itself, does not imply any ability to
function independently or make decisions.
Possessing, at a minimum, autonomy of means is a
necessary precondition for being assigned moral
responsibility. In the context of lethal autonomous
machines, moral responsibility is distinguished from
causal responsibility. Causal responsibility is ascribed
when an agent causes an outcome, while moral
responsibility is ascribed only when an agent makes a
decision that causes an outcome. For example, if a town
is flooded because rain overwhelms the capacity of a
dam, the rain has causal responsibility. If, however, the
town is flooded because shortcuts were taken in building
the dam, the builder bears moral responsibility. Clearly,
the idea of moral responsibility is meaningless without
the decision making power inherent in autonomy.
The most salient aspect of moral responsibility for
an autonomous lethal machine is related to conduct
during battle. Internationally accepted rules of behavior
during wartime, known as Laws of Armed Conflict
(LOAC) or Laws of War (LOW) are drawn from Just
War theory. Just War theory usually consists of two
elements: jus ad bellum, the issues involved in going to
war; and jus in bello, the issues involved in conducting
war (Schulzke, 2011). Even the most enthusiastic
supporter of the role of autonomous lethal UAS would
acknowledge that we are a long way from allowing a
machine to decide when and why we wage war;
therefore, discussion primarily involves jus in bello. The
two generally accepted components of jus in bello are
proportionality and discrimination. Proportionality
requires that the use of force be at an appropriate level
for the threat, while discrimination requires that force be
applied only to the threat rather than to noncombatants.
United States military forces are bound by law to abide
by LOAC (Department of Defense, 2011).
Approaches to Creating Moral Machines
Three approaches are generally considered in the
creation of moral reasoning in robots: top-down, bottomup, and hybrid (Allen, Smit, & Wallach, 2005). The topdown approach involves a rule-based, approach to
programming moral reasoning. Several rule-based
approaches are part of the Western tradition, including
consequentialist, in which the morality of an act is
judged by its outcome, and Kantian, in which moral
behavior consists of adhering to the Categorical
Imperative that one should behave “only according to
that maxim by which you can at the same time will that
it be a universal law” (Gros et al., 2012). In the military
setting, the Laws of War provide a set of rules which

could be used to govern moral reasoning. Top-down
approaches have the advantage of clarity and simplicity,
but operationally, the main weakness is that no set of
rules can anticipate every situation or accommodate
every context. In the real world, rules can often conflict,
requiring prioritization and compromise beyond the
capabilities of a rule based computational system. On
the battlefield, much is left to the judgment of the
soldier.
Some have suggested that instead, robots should
learn morality the way children do, through learning and
experience (Turing, 1950). In this bottom-up approach,
machine learning or artificial evolution would be used to
inculcate moral reasoning in a UAS. As in any
instructional situation, appropriate behavior would be
rewarded while undesirable behavior would be punished
(Allen et al., 2005). The bottom-up approach allows
flexibility in complex situations. However, one of the
main concerns with this approach is that performance
can never be guaranteed. As any parent knows, even
perfect training is not a guarantee of perfect behavior.
Furthermore, if the machine makes a bad moral choice,
there is no way to trace and correct the underlying cause
(Gros et al., 2012). Another objection to this approach
to machine morality is that it does not account for the
effect of natural law. In the Western philosophical
tradition, natural law refers to the presumption that
human beings are born with some intrinsic morality.
Clearly a bottom-up approach would need to account for
the absence of natural law in machines.
Hybrid approaches combine aspects of the top-down
rule based approach with the bottom-up learning
approach. Of the many hybrid approaches, the most
promising is based on virtue ethics (Lin et al., 2008).
Instead of morality built on actions, virtue ethics
considers morality built on character. Actions are
determined by their compatibility with a set of virtues,
for example courage, compassion, or honesty. The
advantage is that virtues themselves constitute top-down
guiding principles, while learning algorithms allow
bottom-up approaches to learning specific actions that
are compatible with the virtues (Lin et al., 2008). A
useful metaphor for the hybrid approach to developing
moral beliefs and behavior can be found in grammar
acquisition. Children acquire a working knowledge of
grammar from experience. However, rules do exist that
govern grammar usage. Similarly, robots could learn
moral beliefs and behavior from experience, but those
same beliefs and behaviors would be learned by
conforming to guiding principles. However, combining
these two opposing strategies involves harmonizing not
only technical approaches, but underlying philosophies.

Perspectives in the Research Community
Divisions exist within the research community not
only about how to engineer moral reasoning in robots,
but also about the ethics of using autonomous lethal
robots at all. The arguments against autonomous lethal
robots are presented largely in the context of Just War
theory. Prominent critics (Sharkey, 2008; Singer, 2009)
argue that risk-free war encourages going to war, and
increases the likelihood of violating of the precepts of
jus ad bellum, the rules of going to war. Another
concern is that the jus in bello principles of
proportionality and discrimination are impossible to
operationalize. No clear definition of “disproportionate
suffering” or “civilian” can be created that would be
airtight in combat situations.
Advocates of autonomous lethal robots assert that
machines do not need to be morally perfect in their
actions, only better than their human counterparts.
Human beings are subject to fatigue, anger, fear,
vengefulness, and other qualities that have been
implicated in wartime atrocities (Arkin, 2010). Robotic
systems, on the other hand, would be able to behave
morally without the weaknesses unavoidable in human
soldiers (Schulzke, 2011).
Opponents also argue that a precondition of jus in
bello is that moral responsibility can be assigned for all
actions (Sparrow, 2007). The very nature of autonomy
means that the robot operates independently, meaning it
would be unfair to hold the programmer or the operator
responsible for the robot’s actions. Supporters counter
that responsibility can be assigned within the framework
of product liability laws (Lucas, 2012). If a faulty
toaster burns your house down, the manufacturer is at
fault: if a faulty robot kills an innocent, the manufacturer
is held morally responsible. These issues remain
unresolved in the literature.
Levels of Autonomy
Complicating the issue of ethical use of autonomous
lethal robots is the fact that autonomy itself has
gradations. The most accepted taxonomy of levels of
machine autonomy is Sheridan’s range from 1, computer
offers no assistance and human does it all, to 10,
computer decides everything and acts autonomously
(Parasuraman et al., 2000).
Another way of approaching autonomy is to describe
it according to human-machine interaction, in which the
lowest level would be the direct control of teleoperation,
and the highest level would be the dynamic autonomy of
peer-to-peer collaboration (Goodrich & Schultz, 2007).
Each military branch has its own slightly different
taxonomy of automation, with some conflating

autonomy and intelligence. However, most researchers
encourage separation of these two constructs, since
complete autonomy is possible without intelligence, for
instance in a jellyfish, and intelligence is possible
without autonomy, for instance in a child (Clough,
2002).
Recently, taxonomies of autonomy have focused on
a three-axis model consisting of the mission complexity
the robot can handle, the environmental difficulty the
robot can handle, and the independence from human
interaction that the robot is capable of (Huang, Pavek,
Novak, Albus, & Messin, 2005). This three-axis model
accounts for the obvious idea that a robot able to handle
a complex mission in a challenging environment should
be considered to have greater autonomy than a robot
capable only of a simple mission under controlled
circumstances, even if both robots have identical human
interaction requirements. For simplicity, this model will
ultimately categorize robot autonomy on a scale of 1-10,
in which the highest level consists of absolutely no
required human interaction.
NEW CONTRIBUTION
Implications for Human Factors
Although the highest levels of autonomy have not
yet been achieved in aviation, some amount of
perception, decision, and action autonomy have been
incorporated in various subsystems, for example Traffic
Collision Alerting Systems (TCAS). In some cases,
automation is linked with autonomy. For example, the
autopilot is physically controlling the aircraft while the
flight management system determines the heading
required for navigation.
Parasuraman and Wickens (2008) have advocated
adjusting levels of automation, and indirectly, autonomy,
according to the stage of human information processing
being supported. They have cautioned against autonomy
in decision making, particularly as it relates to lethality
or human safety, until reliability can be assured. As
noted above, however, supporters of autonomous lethal
UAS argue that reliability need not be perfect, only
better than human reliability in the same situation
(Arkin, 2010).
Automation in aviation has created issues with
system observability, mode confusion, and automation
surprise (Ferris et al., 2010); reduced situation awareness
(SA), trust, reliability, overreliance, and complacency
(Galster et al., 2007); and skill degradation
(Parasuraman et al., 2000).

Observability, mode confusion, automation surprise,
and situation awareness.
Low observability, coupled with high complexity
and decision making authority, creates the potential for
mode confusion and automation surprise, which are
specific failures of situation awareness. The bottom-up
approach to engineering UAS morality would create low
system observability, as the reasoning behind the UAS’
choices would not be known to the operators (Gros et al.,
2012). Combined with the high complexity and decision
making authority inherent in an autonomous UAS, this
low system observability has the potential to degrade
operator SA. Top-down approaches, however, might
alleviate this problem, since operators could become
familiar with the fundamental moral architecture of the
system.
On the flight deck, systems that provide pilots with
greater feedback beyond simply system behavior have
been shown to improve mode awareness (Ferris, Sarter,
& Wickens, 2010). Thus, the design of human-UAS
interface should include clear information about why the
UAS is behaving in a certain way. For example, a UAS
should alert its operator if it is confronted with a moral
choice, and inform the operator of its reasoning process.
Trust, reliability, overreliance, and complacency.
Operator trust in automation effects system
performance (Ferris et al., 2010). Understanding the
rules that govern system behavior has been shown to
increase operator trust (Galster et al., 2007). At the same
time, automation that functions properly but does not
conform to the operator’s expectations has been shown
to reduce trust (Lee & See, 2004). Trust between
humans develops in a different manner from trust
between humans and machines (Lee & See, 2004). The
underpinnings of trust between humans and machines
that have nearly human autonomy will be an interesting
area of research.
In addition to transparency, one of the variables
affecting operator trust is reliability, both actual and
perceived (Lee & See, 2004). When malfunctions do
occur, the UAS failure mode must be apparent. Clearly,
fault alert systems must go beyond warning lights and
horns toward rich, contextual communication to help the
operator understand the failure mode of the UAS.
Excessive trust in automation, however, can lead to
overreliance and complacency (Parasuraman & Riley,
1997). High workload appears to potentiate the effects
of excessive trust, so that operators fail to monitor the
automation as they should (Galster et al., 2007). This
may particularly become an issue as the ratio of
operators to UAS decreases, and operator workload
increases.
As a result of overreliance, operators may fail to
monitor inputs to the automation, reducing SA and

making it difficult to take over should the automation
fail (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997). The lack of SA
created by low system observability would exacerbate
this problem.
Skill degradation.
Automation of manual tasks has been shown to lead
to skill degradation (Parasuraman et al., 2000). The
same effect has been shown for decision making tasks
(Galster et al., 2007). One potential danger of UAS
autonomy is that human operator decision making skills
may be lost. Reverting to lower levels of automation
can successfully ameliorate skill loss, but this strategy
may not be practical in fully autonomous UAS because
of reduced SA due to low system observability,
overreliance, and the distance inherent in the relationship
between an operator and an autonomous agent. In
addition, reverting to a lower level of automation is only
effective if the manual skill, in this case decision
making, has been learned in the first place. How can
human supervisors acquire the skill of ethical decision
making in battlefield situations if they are never meant
to use them operationally?
Training.
Galster et al. (2007) suggest that the highest levels of
machine autonomy may require types of operator
training not required for the lower levels. They suggest
that we already have a model for the skills required for
supervising fully autonomous UAS – that is, supervising
human beings. Some of the skills required include
delegation and communication. Both of these skills
have been taught to military and commercial aircrews
for decades in the form of Crew Resource Management
(CRM). Perhaps CRM training can be tailored to the
unique demands of a system that includes humans,
machines, and machines that behave as humans.
Implications for human centered design
Human centered design is based on the premise that
if humans have final responsibility for a system, the
“human operator should be at the heart of a system with
full authority over all its functioning” (Parasuraman &
Riley, 1997, p. 248). But if the final responsibility for
system safety does not rest with the human operator, is
user-centered design still relevant? What is the place of
human factors engineering if the human being is no
longer the heart of the system?
Further, to some extent, automation shifts the locus
of error from the operator to the designer (Parasuraman
& Riley, 1997). One task for those designing training
and procedures will be to account for and mitigate these
new error modes.

DISCUSSION
Research and development in unmanned military
systems is driving toward full autonomy, even for lethal
systems. This raises ethical questions about the design
and implementation of moral machines. In particular,
the advent of autonomous UAS will create issues in
human-machine interface that go beyond what has been
seen in flight deck and UAS automation to date. Human
factors practitioners must be involved in autonomous
UAS design from the beginning. Looking back at the
issues raised by flight deck automation, and ahead to the
issues unique to the relationship between operators and
autonomous UAS will help prepare human factors
practitioners to address the challenges raised by this
developing technology.
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